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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WI·:~TI•:HX

COXTRACTING

( '( )RPOHATI< >~ (Employer)

and l•:~IPLOYERS i\IUTU A L
LIABILITY INSUHANCE
C0\1 PANY OF WISCONSIN,
((-.arrier).
Plaintiffs,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9970

IXDUsrrRL\ L COi\Ii\IISSION OF
rTA II and LEO A. DAVIS,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' REP·L Y BRIEF
This brief is filed in accordance with Rule 75 ( p),
rtnh Rules of Civil Procedure in order that response may
be made to what plaintiffs believe are misstatements in
defenda11t8' brief of (1) the rationale of certain cases
therein cited, and (2) the underlying philosophy of the
compensation acts.

ARGUMENT
POIXT I.
THERE IS XO ~IODERN TREND TOWARD
EYALU.:\.TION OF EYE IJIPAIRMENT ON
AX rXCORRECTED BASIS. THE SCHISni
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Defendants suggest, on page 8 of their brief, that
there has been a recent and general judicial acceptance
of the proposition that visual disability should be evaluated without reference to correctibility, so that Professor Schneider's statement (quoted at page 4 of plaintiffs'
brief) is no longer valid.
We will concede, of course, (since we first cited the
annotations which discuss it) that there is a sharp division of authority on the issue which here concerns us.
We do not perceive that the schism is becoming less pronounced, but we submit that, if it is, it is because more
courts are becoming persuaded that evaluation without
reference to correctibility does violence to basic compensation principles and common sense.
What constitutes the "weight" of authority may be
decided on either a quantitative or qualitative approach.
The editors of American Jurisprudence still, as of 1963,
consider it to be the view of "most authorities" that the
degree of impairment should be determined on a corrected basis. (See statement on page 5 of plaintiff's
brief.) Some of the very cases cited by defendants as
most strongly supporting their position are distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. In Otoe Food
Products v. Cruickshatnk, 141 Neb. 298, 3 N.W. 2nd 452,
for instance, the claimant's injured eye could be improved in acuity by an optical lens, but it could not be
made to coordinate with his other eye. Defendants cite
Livingston v. St. Pa;ul Hydraulic Hoist Company, 203
Minn. 62; 270 N.W. 829, which has since been reviewed
and its doctrine restated by the Minnesota Court. In
2
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v. Prospect Foundry Company, 115 N.W. 2nd
477, (May 11, 1962) that Court considered a claim for
total disability benefits where good vision could be
restored with glasses. The opinion unequivocally places
~linnesota among the jurisdictions holding that correctibility should be considered when eye disability is evaluntetl. At page 483, Justice Nelson, speaking for a unanimous Court, says:
''In determining the extent of injuries to vision resulting from an industrial accident, correction by
glasses may be taken into consideration.''
If a trend can be discerned in recent cases, it is toward the position that disability should be determined
with due consideration for correctibility. This trend is
particularly to be noted in cases where an eye is injured
which was previously industrially blind without glasses
and because of the injury, can no longer be made effective by corrective lenses. In Illinois (Lambert v. Industrial Com mission, 411 Til. 593; 104 N. E. 2nd 783) and Vir-\
ginia ( Tralsh Construction Co. v. London, 80 S.E. 2nd
3~4) the Courts have very recently held that an eye, industrially blind without correction but functional with
~lasses, is not really blind and that the workman whose
Pye is injured so that it is no longer correctible is entitled
to full compensation.
1/

These cases bring dramatically to our attention that
there is another side to the coin. If we are to conclude
that correctibility is not to be considered in compensation
eases, we must also conclude (if we are to be consistent)
that a workman who is blind without glasses but has good
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vision with them has lost nothing if he sustains an injury
which deprives him of the capacity to see with glasses.
Defendants would ask this Court to find that such a workman was already blind within the meaning of the compensation acts.
There are cases which come to a contrary and, we believe, ill-reasoned conclusion, but the Courts which have
demonstrated perception of the entire problem have recognized a basic and irrefutable difference between corrctible and uncorrectible blindness.
As has already been pointed out (page 8 of plaintiffs' brief) this Court has previously indicated its
approval of the language of Cline v. Studebaker Corporation where the Michigan Court said that correctibl('
blindness is not blindness at all. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, when confronted with a loss of vision case
arising in Utah, had no hesitation in stating its opinion.
"We may assume, and it is our opinion," said Judge Cotteral, '' ... appellee, having only a partial loss of vision
which was subject to correction by the use of glasses,
did not sustain a total disability.'' (United Sta.tes Smelting Co. v. Evatns, 35 F. 2nd 459.) Whenever a Court in
this jurisdiction has made a statement relevant to the
issue in this case, it has indicated its approval of the
Cline v. Studebaker position.

POINT II.
THE PURPOSE OF THE COMPENSATION
ACTS IS TO PROVIDE A SUBSTITUTE FOR
EARNING POWER LOST BY REASON OF
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INDURTRIAL INJURY.
PlTRPOSE

TO

AWARD

IT IS NOT THEIR
DAMAGES FOR

I~JlTHY.

Defendants ha\·e urged that this Court adopt an appron<'h to Workmen's Compensation in harmony with the
philosophy of that old N.A.C.C.A. spokesman and warrior, Samuel Horovitz. Defendants quote from a 1947
nrtirle of :\I r. Horovitz in which he contends the ''current
trend" is to treat compensation cases as personal injury
rnst>s. Such statements have generally horrified those
whose Yiew of workmen's compensation is more objective.
Cornell University's Professor Arthur Larson, whose
11
Law of W'"orkmen's Compensation" (Mathew Bender,
Hl:>~) is perhaps the most respected work on the subject,
has this to say in that treatise :
''Once you decide to make awards for bodily impairments unrelated to earning capacity, where do
you stop, and on what basis do you calculate the
amount of the award 1 Let us say, for example,
that a court decides to make an award for a scar
on claimant's abdomen which his business associates will never see- what is the measure of compensation'? There is only one available guide,
common-law damages; but surely it would be unthinkable to give full common-law damages for
non-disabling injuries while concededly awarding
only a fraction of such damages for disabling injuries. How much is the South Carolina court,
having announced that loss of a tooth is compensable even it does not affect appearance, prepared
to offer for loss of one rear molar which no one
eYer sees except claimant's dentist? The erratic
amounts awarded in cases approaching this problem give some indication of what happens when
you abandon one principle without putting another
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in its place. In the South Carolina case, $800 was
awarded for four teeth; $200 was awarded for the
same number in the Oklahoma case; while in a
Missouri case $50 was allowed for the loss of thirty-one teeth.''
(Page 50, Volume II, Section 52.32)
In compensation cases, it is seldom considered appropriate to restate basic principles as a foundation for
the decision. When Courts do talk about the underlying
philosophy of compensation, however, they are usually
direct. For example, the Minnesota Court (for which
defendants seem to have particular affection) made this
statement in Miller v. Mutual Life Insurance C'ornpan.y,
2061\Enn. 221; 289 N.W. 299:
"In Workmen's Compensation cases, the object
of the law is to provide benefits to the injured employee during disability irrespective of the employer's fault. The law does not contemplate benefits if the employee can be restored to industrial
capacity.''
The Horovitz concept has not been enthusiastically endorsed by the bench or the writers in this field, and it
should not be adopted by this Court now.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
By FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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